The search for the New World Order

26/10/2005 0 By Rodrigo Cintra
The Second Iraq War still has its remnants among nations, however, several international relations analysts already present serious conclusions about its impacts on the world order. For the time being, they avoid talking about a New World Order since this could refer the most unsuspecting to the times of Bush senior or even to the analyzes published at that time and which proved to be totally unfounded a few years later.

The French School of International Relations teaches us to seek founding moments to explain the parameters of the international system, finding them is fundamental for us to be able to expose more clearly the international macro-trends, in order to enhance the pursuit of our interests. However, the eagerness to identify them can significantly alter the analyst's concentration., as well as addicting part of its conceptual structure.
Since the end of the Cold War, the international system has not been able to clearly express its general principles and limits.. And & eacute; o momento, what is known for sure is that we didn't find the same structure we found before, whatever, the nations divided into three groups: communists, capitalists and non-aligned. As only the first two had as members great powers with nuclear power and willingness to expand their conception of the world to other regions, it was agreed to call that structure bipolar.
Today, given the difficulty of finding the new systemic patterns, we tend to use the same methodological model as the analytical basis at that time.. Like this, analysts continue to think in terms of poles of power. Analyzes are spread over a wide range of varieties., going from the absolute unipolarism of the US superpower to the condominium of great powers, from unimultipolarism to sectoral multipolarism.
The result of all this is a large amount of analyzes that do little to help understand the contemporary international reality, or because of the total uselessness of some concepts (as is the case of Huntington's unimultipolarism) as due to the lack of articulation between the different variables. (as is the case of sectoral multipolarism).
when we add it all up – the weight of the analytical heritage of the Fira War and the “theoretical confusion” contemporary – we result in a certain intellectual disorientation. Thus, what you see are analysts trying to identify the great light that will help us get out of the cave and avoid the confusion of the shadows.

Just like any other big event we've had since the end of the Cold War – Iraq War I,  intervention in Bosnia, attacks of 11 September and, now, II Iraq War – what we see happening now is the identification of the New National Security Doctrine as the central idea that will reference all international issues.

If we go back to the discussions that preceded the Second Iraq War, we will see passionate analysts take sides. Some said that the war (in this case intervention) would be justifiable insofar as it reaffirmed some limits of the international system, eliminating the growing and dangerous idealism; on the other side, there were analysts who were against the war (in this case invasion) that would break with the international rules and norms conquered with great effort and care, opening the door to the return of dangerous realism.

Once the phase of direct confrontation between the United States and Iraq ends, the discussion of war loses its space in the media and no longer produces the impactful photos and stories of its beginning. E, What's worse, those countries that were against the way the war was conducted, now they have softened their speeches and started to look for ways to also participate in the division of the spoils of the war..
This near disinterest of the executors of international politics in the alleged split of the international system caused by the war weakened this analytical line, leaving us once again orphans of analytical frameworks. Therefore, sought in the New Doctrine of National Security (perhaps the most important event that still seems to have real impacts on international relations), putting the 11 of September again in fashion.
A first precaution that we must take in relation to this is that such an analytic form carries with it some premises not necessarily proven yet. Among them is the unquestionable centrality of the United States in the international system, that would determine a structure highly dependent on the movements of the single superpower. Studies on interdependence point to a two-way relationship, even if one of them finds a greater movement than the other. Thus, we should rather ask what is the real disparity of power between the powers and, about everything, whether this disparity is maintained thanks to the exclusive effort of the superpower or whether it is based on the international system itself, that is, if it somehow escapes the direct and mechanical control of the superpower.
Another premise that is found in most analyzes is the idea that there is order in the international system or that at least this system always tends to find order. Studies on regionalization and globalization may indicate the emergence of a new systemic format in which there will be several regional orders that will relate to each other, however this does not mean that this inter-regional relationship will be standardized or stable.. Perhaps polarities are no longer enough concepts to analyze contemporary international relations, and we must replace it with international multi-order.
One last idea that must remain in our analysis is the eternal questioning about the choice of founding moment. Maybe we haven't found it because it hasn't happened yet.. Sometimes the desire to be the announcer of the good news makes us declare on the eve of the announcement the impacts that will come from it, without bothering with the necessary and honest revision of forecasts. Not to confirm analytical errors, we tend to confirm them, under penalty of further increasing the current analytical confusion. Certainly all the intellectual efforts aimed at helping us better understand the world we live in are valid and praiseworthy, however, now, more than never, intellectual honesty and analytical rigor are fundamental qualities.
Sao Paulo, 07 June 2003