Conversations have been taking place between members of the European Union for a few months (EU) and members of Mercosur. At the beginning, such conversations took place in a scenario of back and forth in the negotiations of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (ALCA), the game seemed to occur more around diplomatic rhetoric, at a time when Brazil sought to increase its negotiating power with the United States.
In view of the unacknowledged failure of the FTAA as previously imagined, each American negotiator has been seeking to strengthen themselves for a second phase of negotiations, to occur in 2005, when the American political scenario is consolidated. While the US is signing a set of bilateral treaties that should dictate the minimum parameters under which negotiations will resume, Mercosur members started to take the proposal to bring the EU closer together more seriously.
The European Union's rapprochement with Mercosur, which recently presented itself as more of a socio-cultural – with constant references to the common cultural past -, now begins to present its most important facet: a much deeper and more complex trading game.
The contours that this conversation will take still depend on European problems that have not been fully resolved. From 1º next May, will enter the EU 10 new member states, cujos perfis econômicos são muito semelhantes aos dos países do Mercosul.
A entrada destes novos membros demandará enormes recursos da UE na medida em que são Estados significativamente mais pobres que de seus futuros parceiros, além de que exercerão uma profunda pressão migratória nos próximos anos caso não haja uma boa integração de suas estruturas econômico-produtivas na lógica comercial européia.
Therefore, e visto que apresentam um perfil agrícola bastante acentuado, é de se esperar que a UE concentre-se no tratamento destes Estados mais do que no beneficiamento de terceiros Estados, como é o caso dos membros do Mercosul. This scenario made us strange about the EU's rapprochement with Mercosur precisely at the moment when it presents the challenge of expansion.
However, now the negotiating scenario starts to become clearer. There are currently moves by the EU to exchange an agreement on favorable access to Mercosur agricultural products to the EU, with the reduction of pressure that Mercosur has been exerting in the Doha round regarding the suspension of agricultural subsidies.
According to the Brazilian ambassador to the EU, José Alfredo Graça Lima, essa aproximação é "um incentivo para o Mercosul não pressionar a UE na OMC", sendo que "isso fará o Mercosul um aliado, não um adversário".
The question that still remains is whether this is a real move by the EU or just a diplomatic maneuver., given that the current EU trade negotiator, Pascal Lamy, will leave his post next October.
Anyway, It appears that these negotiations are aimed specifically at Brazil, since the country leads the G-20, which has presented decisive positions on the elimination of agricultural subsidies at the WTO. A change in Brazilian position could represent a real weakening of the G-20 and, therefore, a change in the pattern of negotiations in Doha.
While Brazilian diplomacy says it will not take measures that could harm the G-20, especially in relation to its two main partners, China and India, the proposal is being considered. On the other hand, there are still political barriers to overcome in the EU. A preferential deal, at the same time that it can benefit the EU in the WTO, will tend to open new internal European points of tension (cases of sugar and the meat complex) and external (trade crises with Africa and the Caribbean).
It still remains for Brazilian diplomacy, in light of the interests of its Mercosur partners, measure the short and medium term gains that this scenario presents. The G-20 has been bothering major players in the international system and, thereby, offers greater respectability to its members when negotiating. however, There is a moment when this discomfort stops being an aggregator and becomes an element of discrimination.
On the other hand, Access to the European agricultural market could bring enormous short-term gains to Mercosur, favoring a marked expansion of agribusiness, in addition to consolidation in already well-developed markets such as soybeans. However, If this open potential is not well utilized, we will miss a great opportunity to assert ourselves in the international market, at the same time that we will have abandoned the G-20 negotiating table.
The international scenario is favorable and players are starting to show their cards, but the game will only be in our hands if we create a good negotiating strategy.
The European Union's rapprochement with Mercosur, which recently presented itself as more of a socio-cultural – with constant references to the common cultural past -, now begins to present its most important facet: a much deeper and more complex trading game.
The contours that this conversation will take still depend on European problems that have not been fully resolved. From 1º next May, will enter the EU 10 new member states, cujos perfis econômicos são muito semelhantes aos dos países do Mercosul.
A entrada destes novos membros demandará enormes recursos da UE na medida em que são Estados significativamente mais pobres que de seus futuros parceiros, além de que exercerão uma profunda pressão migratória nos próximos anos caso não haja uma boa integração de suas estruturas econômico-produtivas na lógica comercial européia.
Therefore, e visto que apresentam um perfil agrícola bastante acentuado, é de se esperar que a UE concentre-se no tratamento destes Estados mais do que no beneficiamento de terceiros Estados, como é o caso dos membros do Mercosul. This scenario made us strange about the EU's rapprochement with Mercosur precisely at the moment when it presents the challenge of expansion.
However, now the negotiating scenario starts to become clearer. There are currently moves by the EU to exchange an agreement on favorable access to Mercosur agricultural products to the EU, with the reduction of pressure that Mercosur has been exerting in the Doha round regarding the suspension of agricultural subsidies.
According to the Brazilian ambassador to the EU, José Alfredo Graça Lima, essa aproximação é "um incentivo para o Mercosul não pressionar a UE na OMC", sendo que "isso fará o Mercosul um aliado, não um adversário".
The question that still remains is whether this is a real move by the EU or just a diplomatic maneuver., given that the current EU trade negotiator, Pascal Lamy, will leave his post next October.
Anyway, It appears that these negotiations are aimed specifically at Brazil, since the country leads the G-20, which has presented decisive positions on the elimination of agricultural subsidies at the WTO. A change in Brazilian position could represent a real weakening of the G-20 and, therefore, a change in the pattern of negotiations in Doha.
While Brazilian diplomacy says it will not take measures that could harm the G-20, especially in relation to its two main partners, China and India, the proposal is being considered. On the other hand, there are still political barriers to overcome in the EU. A preferential deal, at the same time that it can benefit the EU in the WTO, will tend to open new internal European points of tension (cases of sugar and the meat complex) and external (trade crises with Africa and the Caribbean).
It still remains for Brazilian diplomacy, in light of the interests of its Mercosur partners, measure the short and medium term gains that this scenario presents. The G-20 has been bothering major players in the international system and, thereby, offers greater respectability to its members when negotiating. however, There is a moment when this discomfort stops being an aggregator and becomes an element of discrimination.
On the other hand, Access to the European agricultural market could bring enormous short-term gains to Mercosur, favoring a marked expansion of agribusiness, in addition to consolidation in already well-developed markets such as soybeans. However, If this open potential is not well utilized, we will miss a great opportunity to assert ourselves in the international market, at the same time that we will have abandoned the G-20 negotiating table.
The international scenario is favorable and players are starting to show their cards, but the game will only be in our hands if we create a good negotiating strategy.
Originally published in:
magazine Author
special CNPq
Yes IV – nº 33 / Mar & ccedil; the 2004
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