Congress and formula MAKE-HANDS, the pol & iacute; External topical

Some of the existing studies on the participation of the North American Congress in foreign policy issues argue that the Executive branch is decisive in its formulation and that Congress participates in them only marginally.. According to these analyzes, the president plays a central role in defining this policy, having a set of determinations of the Supreme Court (Supreme Court) as a legal basis for the execution of this task. Besides that, the studies emphasize that the institutional structure of the Congress would not be adequate for its involvement in this type of question.

When studying Congress participation in foreign policy issues, you can see that, It seems, it effectively takes place in a marginal condition, more focused on supporting presidential decisions than actually formulating concrete proposals. However,

“if Congress’s influence over foreign policy resided solely in its ability to legislate its own policy preferences, then we would have our answer [Congress plays some role in shaping US foreign policy?]. But focusing on the legislative track record captures only part of the story. Congress influences policy through several indirect means: anticipated reactions, changes in the decision-making process in the executive branch, and political grandstanding. Indeed, the same factors that frustrate congressional attempts to lead on foreign affairs encourage legislators to use indirect means to influence policy. Attention to these indirect means suggests, contrary to the argument made by pessimists, that Congress often exercises considerable influence over the substance of U. S. foreign policy” (Lindsay, 1992-1993: 609).

In addition to this form of "indirect" participation, Congress influences foreign policy using its veto capacity. This means that he will not necessarily need to speak officially on an issue; the very observation of trends among parliamentarians can be an important configuring element of a foreign policy. It turns out that, in crisis situations, executive power excels in formulating and implementing certain policies in view of its power of control over formulators and its ability to quickly execute them. However, in other cases, the speed of decision-making and the change in locus decision making give importance to Congress again in foreign trade policy decisions. Like this, “the object is not to pass bills but to use the threat of legislation as a lever with which to pressure the president” (Lindsay, 1992-1993: 612).

At the institutional level, some reforms implemented in the last three decades have reduced the power of committee chairs, that was transferred to the subcommittees. Even though institutional reforms of 1994 have returned part of this power to those presidents, there is a kind of cross-relationship between committees, which prevents thematic concentration in only one of them. Like this, the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are not solely responsible for formulating foreign policy proposals in Congress, sharing this responsibility with several other committees.

At the same time, the emergence of various agencies and executive bodies dealing with specific foreign policy issues (notably the committees of Commerce, Finance, Judiciary, Banking, e Ways and Means) increases the complexity of the foreign policy formulation process and, consequently, the need to share power with other levels.

It should be noted that, in the decades of 1950 e 1960 Congress behaved in a subordinate manner with little interest in the effective formulation of foreign policy, from the decade of 1980 there is an important change in this profile, when then Congress starts to adopt measures that contradict those defended by the executive branch.

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originally published in:
magazine Author – Yes V – nº 51 / September 2005

http://www.revistaautor.com.br/artigos/2005/51rci.htm